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ABSTRACT 
 
Background: A need for increased access to effective therapies for depression has 
been identified in the United Kingdom. There has been significant investment in 
Cognitive Therapy but a perceived lack of funding for alternatives. This study takes a 
pluralistic perspective in enquiring into what neuroscience offers us in understanding 
Cognitive Therapy and Person-Centred Therapy for Depression. 
Methodology: This realist synthesis review provides a background of the theories, 
mapped for commonality in causality and therapy for depression. It examines 
neuroscience theory of depression and fMRI evidence of the effects of Cognitive 
Therapy and Person-Centred therapeutic concepts on the brain. 
Findings: This review highlights some of the limitations of scanning technology and 
the way that research within ‘schools’ interprets evidence from the perspective of a 
particular theory. This has led to evidence being presented for the case of cognitive 
control of emotion. The alternate hypothesis for emotional regulation was not tested 
in the studies reviewed despite being observed as the mechanism of change in drug 
therapy for depression. Since all disciplines and theories reviewed suggest the 
involvement of both cognitive and affective processes further research is suggested 
to clarify their interaction.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
"If theory could be seen for what it is - a fallible, changing attempt to construct a 
network of gossamer threads which will contain the solid facts - then a theory 
will serve as it should, as a stimulus to further creative thinking." 
(Rogers, 1959, p191). 
 
This study originated to enquire if neuroscience could prove that different therapies 
have different mechanisms of action in the brain. I soon realised that the answer 
would be much more complicated. I have had to lay aside my original ideas that on 
reflection I realise were about finding nice neat answers. Instead I have learned to 
look at what the literature reviewed is able to show and also crucially what it is not 
able to show. I aim to be explicit as to the reasons for my initial assumptions and 
what prompted me to change them in a reflexive statement in chapter 7. 
 
All theories of psychological distress and theories of therapy have to some degree 
been developed because a theoretician or practitioner has observed a phenomenon 
that has intrigued them and they have sought to explain that phenomenon (Elton-
Wilson, 1996). This can be summarised as how humans get into psychological 
difficulties such as depression, and how we get out of them. 
 
There is only one phenomenon under investigation (human distress), yet a 
staggering variety of competing and complimentary theories abound. In current times 
the drive for evidence based practice has led to much study of what works and 
outcome studies of therapy, measuring therapy as if it were a medication or 
manualised clinical treatment with an emphasis on Randomised Controlled Trials 
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(RCT’s). This has led to considerable investment in the UK in Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy (CBT) which since its inception has been presented as relatively manualised 
(Beck, 1964, p 571). 
 
This follows the secessionist model underpinning clinical trials which holds that 
causality is established when the cause is activated and the effect is observed to 
follow. In contrast the generative model of causality holds that to infer a causal 
outcome between two events we need to understand the underlying mechanism that 
connects them and the context in which the relationship occurs. Under realism the 
basic question changes from "what works?" to "what works for whom in what 
circumstances?" (Pawson et al, 2005, p22).  
 
Rationale. 
Since reality is complex and we can never control all the variables in the way the 
secessionist model requires, realism takes a different approach. Pawson (2006, p22) 
states that an option is to consider the role of social science to be primarily critical of 
the lay thoughts and actions that lie behind false explanations. This is my overall aim 
- to be critical of misinterpretation and over-extrapolation, to synthesise in context 
what can be synthesised and to allow to remain separate what is separate or 
unexplained.  
 
Since the information required for answering the review question was to be drawn 
from disparate sources it was important to choose a method of review that could deal 
with this level of complexity (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006, p20).  
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Instead of focussing on outcomes a realist synthesis focuses on gathering evidence 
on how complex social interventions are theorized to work and evidence to test or 
refine this theory or theories. Petticrew & Roberts (2006, p20) argue that "Systematic 
reviews allow challenge to the paradigm to occur - a challenge permitted by close 
examination of the underpinning evidence".  
 
My overall goal is to produce a realist synthesis review of literature from Cognitive 
Therapy (CT), Person-Centred Therapy (PCT), Cognitive Affective Neuroscience and 
Social Affective Neuroscience in order to answer the main review question:  
 
What does Neuroscience offer us in understanding Cognitive Therapy and 
Person-Centred Therapy for Depression?  
 
This investigation considers theories in the way that Pawson et al suggest "reviews 
should pick up, track and evaluate theories that implicitly or explicitly underlie 
interventions" (Pawson, 2005, p22). 
 
Aims of the Review: 
1) To define the concept of depression. 
2) To define the causality of depression as proposed in Cognitive Therapy & 
Person-Centred Therapy in order to ascertain whether we should expect 
different or similar underlying brain mechanisms (neural signatures) for the 
theories considered.  
3) To make explicit my understanding of CT & PCT theories of therapy for 
depression in order to understand whether we should expect different or 
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similar neural pathways for recovery from depression for the therapies 
considered. 
4) To make explicit what fMRI studies of therapy offer us in understanding CT 
and PCT therapy for depression. 
5) To make explicit my understanding of the neural correlates of depression from 
the perspective of neuroscience, through examining fMRI studies relating to 
therapy for depression and concepts relating to CT and PCT. 
6) To make explicit the conclusions that I draw from the review process in a 
narrative synthesis, in order to answer the review question, advance the 
literature and contribute to the contemporary debate.  
 
Aims 1 to 5 will primarily be achieved within the literature review (chapter two). Aim 6 
is presented in the literature review, the findings (chapter four) and discussion 
(chapter five). 
 
Introduction to Methodology; a narrative review in 3 steps: 
a) Meta-ethnography for the qualitative studies (exploring the relationships and 
differences between study findings and the extent to which they reflect 
common, higher order themes). 
b) Analyzing the findings within each of the categories. 
c) Synthesising the findings across all included studies. 
 
Needing to tightly control my focus for the purpose of this review brings some 
limitations. In this review I will not consider cultural, genetic, social or other potentially 
impactful aspects of context in detail. I am acutely aware of the hole that not 
including contributions from the theories, literature and research in the 
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psychodynamic tradition leaves in my work. In this I am aware of a frustration at not 
being able to get at the whole answer. I hope that I can improve my understanding, 
and possibly that of others. I see this work as a pilot project for future research since 
my conclusions point to further areas for investigation. 
 
In the following literature review I will define the key concepts considered as outlined 
in the above aims in order to provide a context for the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
Literature Review 
 
"There are so many things you can learn about BUT...you’ll miss the best bits if 
you keep your eyes shut." Dr. Seuss (1999, p26) 
 
This chapter has two purposes and is divided into subsections which relate to the 
study aims as outlined in chapter 1. The first purpose is to provide a background to 
the study including defining key concepts and the second is to critically appraise the 
literature retrieved during the search. Both contribute to answering the review 
question in chapter 5.   
 
Defining Depression: 
Depression has been called the common cold of mental health (Hoag & 
Deffenbacher, 1998). This is related to its prevalence. Depression without anxiety is 
experienced by 2.6% of the population in England (Mind, 2011). This is based on the 
Health & Social Care Information Centre (2009) results of a household survey. The 
London School of Economics (LSE, 2006) state that depression accounts for 17% of 
causes of disability and that 38% of incapacity benefits are given due to ‘Mental 
Disorder’, with 2.5% of people between 16 and 75 suffering from depression at that 
time. The LSE stress that people’s lives are crippled by depression and that there are 
few forms of deprivation worse than chronic mental illness. Due to the public health 
significance, much research effort has been focussed on understanding the 
underlying causes of depression (Beevers, 2005).  
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Central to depression is depressed mood and/or loss of pleasure in most activities. 
Severity is determined by both the number and severity of symptoms, as well as how 
much it interferes with the effected person’s life. (NICE, 2010, p3).  A formal 
diagnosis using the ICD-10 classification system requires at least four out of ten 
depressive symptoms, whereas the DSM-IV system requires at least five out of nine 
for a diagnosis of major depression (NICE, 2010). Symptoms should be present for at 
least 2 weeks and each symptom should be present at sufficient severity for most of 
every day. Both diagnostic systems require key symptoms to be present (DSM-IV x 2 
and ICD-10 x 1). Key symptoms include low mood,1 loss of interest and pleasure2 or 
loss of energy3. I do not include an exhaustive list of symptoms as both systems 
emphasise that symptoms vary by individual, by intensity and combination. Cognitive 
symptoms include negative thoughts and affective symptoms include sadness. 
 
CT Causality of Depression: 
Westbrook, Kennerley and Kirk (2011) explain that there are many approaches within 
the therapeutic banner termed Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, and that it is still 
evolving in both theory and practice. 
 
In this study I focus on Beckian Cognitive Therapy (CT) as originally outlined by and 
still reviewed and developed by Beck (1963, 1964, 2005, 2008, Davis & Beck, 2010). 
The theory has strong roots in phenomenology as well as more modern cognitive 
psychology.  "The philosophical origins of cognitive therapy can be traced back to the 
Stoic philosophers" (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979, p. 8), demonstrating the 
attitude of both pessimism and optimism (that human beings have a strong tendency 
                                                          
 
2
 In both ICD-10 and DSM-IV. 
3
 In ICD-10 only. 
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to sabotage themselves as well as also holding the capacity for change and to self-
actualize). 
 
The fundamental principle is that different cognitions defined by Beck (1964, p562/3) 
"as any mental activity that has a verbal content" give rise to different emotions. Beck 
proposes that cognitions operate on more than one level and has advanced a theory 
of cognitive vulnerability to depression (Beck, 2008) based on the idea that adverse 
early life experiences cause dysfunctional attitudes to develop resulting in a cognitive 
vulnerability to depression. This vulnerability is located in the hypothetical construct 
of cognitive schemas which can be seen as the deepest level of cognitive 
processing. This schema can then be activated by adverse daily life events through 
cognitive reactivity. The repeated cognitive activation of negative schemas become 
organised into a depressive mode. This mode becomes the most prominent mode of 
information processing resulting in a decreased ability to reappraise negative views 
culminating in depression. Beck also proposes that negative life stresses that match 
the underlying mode are more likely to provoke depression than those experiences 
that differ from it. 
 
PCT Causality of Depression. 
In defining PCT I rely on the original theory of Carl Rogers (1957, 1959, 1969, 1974, 
1979, 1989) and on developments of his theory by Mearns and Thorne (2007).  
 
Rogers’ theory is rooted in the philosophy of phenomenology and humanism. Rogers’ 
(1959) relies on the existence of the actualising tendency or motivational force which 
drives humans to grow and develop. He states that it is our relationships with others, 
due to our need for positive regard that have an ability to cause us psychological 
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damage through the ways that we symbolise, or distort symbolisation of our 
experience in order to fit with our self-concept or the way we perceive that we need 
to be to receive positive regard from significant others. This differs from our ideal self 
which is the way we judge things when using undistorted experience to evaluate and 
appraise a situation. He states that this distortion of experience leaves us vulnerable 
(to neurosis) or incongruent.  
 
Rogers does not specifically use the term depression. I will make clear the reasons 
that I consider Rogers’ concepts of vulnerability and incongruence to relate to 
depression as this has a bearing on the validity of this study. Are the constructs of 
the two theories addressing the same, or different psychological issues? Unless they 
are sufficiently similar then the conclusions that may be drawn will be weakened. 
 
Beck is very specific in his early work as to the symptomology of depression. This is 
a good match to diagnostic criteria used today. Rogers did not seek as Beck did to 
define specific disorders or separate causes for them. He did however define the 
concepts of vulnerability and incongruence and it is within these definitions that the 
link with depression can be made. 
 
Rogers (1959) suggested that the concept of self was disorganized by contradictory 
experience and a difficulty assimilating the contradictory experience causes the 
person to experience threat as disorganised or incongruent  or "what is commonly 
called neurotic behaviour" (p203). Neurosis is defined by the online oxford dictionary 
as: 
"...a relatively mild mental illness that is not caused by organic disease, 
involving symptoms of stress (depression, anxiety, obsessive behaviour, 
hypochondria) but not a radical loss of touch with reality."  
 
10 
 
Hence I rely on Rogers’ use of the term neurosis in making the link to what today is 
commonly known as depression. The person centred tradition is keen to emphasise 
the importance of the phenomenological experience of the person experiencing 
distress and this seems to lead to avoiding terms such as depression in an attempt to 
avoid pejoratively labelling a person. The literature reviewed from other disciplines 
also stresses the differences in individual experiences of depression.  
 
The Role of Cognition and Affect in CT and PCT. 
Rogers’ thoughts on the role of cognition in experiencing are not often highlighted in 
the literature. Perhaps this is as he stated that his 1959 paper is the most universally 
ignored of all his papers; despite being the one he was most satisfied with (Rogers, 
1974). In this paper he makes explicit that:  
"Experiencing - experiencing a feeling an emotionally tinged experience, 
together with its personal meaning. Thus it includes emotion, but also the 
cognitive content of the meaning of that emotion in its experiential context. It 
thus refers to the unity of emotion and cognition as they are experienced 
inseparably in the moment." (Rogers, 1959, p198). 
 
Similarly Beck’s thoughts on the role of affect are less easy to locate than his views 
on cognition. However in his original 1964 paper he states that there: 
"...appears to be an interaction between cognition and affect because the 
converse also seems to be true; the more intense the affective state, the more 
credible the depressive cognitions seem to the patient. Also when the intensity 
of the affect is reduced, there is apt to be a diminution in the compelling quality 
of the cognition." (Beck, 1964, p568). 
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CT Theory of Therapy. 
Beck (2010, p419) states that CT:  
"...is a structured, collaborative and problem-oriented psychotherapy that seeks 
to reduce symptom expression by modifying maladaptive thought, attitudes and 
beliefs as well as faulty information processing biases that characterize 
emotional disturbance."  
 
In CT the therapist educates the client about how CT is supposed to work 
(Westbrook, Kennerley & Kirk, 2011). This may include didactic teaching and 
experiential exercises with the underlying premise as Beevers (2005) states that a 
person can be taught to challenge negative thinking. Beck states that in examining 
the validity of the cognition the patient learns to make a distinction between "thinking" 
and "believing" (1964, p569). 
 
Therapist qualities that are valued in other therapies are equally important in CT. 
Warmth, empathy and UPR as defined by Rogers have been found to be typical of 
CT therapists (Wright and Davis, 1994 cited by Westbrook et al p40). Therapists who 
act with Rogers conditions are shown to have consistently better outcomes (Lambert 
& Bergin, 1994; Orlinsky et al, 1994 cited by Westbrook). CBT sees the relationship 
not as the fundamental tool, but as the foundation for effective therapy "necessary 
but not sufficient for good treatment result" (Westbrook & Kennerley, 2011, p 39). 
 
Overall the aims of CT are challenging negative assumptions and building new 
schemas through practice with the goal of relief from depression. 
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PCT Theory of Therapy. 
Rogers (1959) proposed that six conditions were necessary for therapy although 
other elements were often or usually present. The conditions can be summarised as 
that two people are in psychological contact; that the client is incongruent and 
vulnerable or anxious; That the therapist is congruent in the relationship; that the 
therapist is experiencing unconditional positive regard toward the client; that the 
therapist is experiencing an empathic understanding of the client’s internal frame of 
reference; and that the client perceives, at least to a minimal degree the empathy 
and UPR of the therapist for the client (p213). 
 
Rogers was clear that each therapist’s way of being may be different than another’s 
and that the key aspect of congruence or realness on the part of the therapist over 
that of adopting a therapeutic role was what mattered. The emphasis is on 
understanding the client’s perspective.  Empathy and UPR are aimed at reducing 
threat, since threat increases the client’s need to defend the existing self-concept 
rather than symbolising new experience accurately. This comes with an emphasis on 
the affective. However Rogers is explicit about the process of accurate symbolisation 
"Accurate symbolisation in awareness rests on the ability to test a hypothesis - failure 
to test leads to incongruence" (Rogers, 1959, p199). So whilst the emphasis may be 
on the importance of affective understanding the aim of the therapist must also be 
toward helping the client to a full experiencing, not simply an affective over cognitive 
experiencing.  
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Potential and Limitations of fMRI. 
Before making explicit the neural correlates for depression suggested by 
Neuroscience I will discuss some of the potential and limitations of fMRI imaging in 
order to provide a context in which to understand the suggested neural correlates. 
 
With the advent of fMRI scanning neuroscientists have been able to start exploring 
the biological basis of emotion and even how the adult brain responds to 
psychotherapeutic interventions. Cozolino examines the multiplicity of ways that 
psychotherapy conceptualises helping clients through an Interpersonal Neuroscience 
lens, arguing that an understanding of neuroscience is essential to the practice of 
good psychotherapy, since psychotherapy has demonstrable effects on the brain 
(Cozolino, 2010). 
 
fMRI has no therapeutic benefits in itself. Its potential value lies in determining the 
effects of person to person psychotherapy and observable effects on the brain. It 
could be argued that the fMRI environment produces counter-therapeutic 
experiences. It is difficult to imagine how we could arrive at a situation where therapy 
is measurable in real time with a therapist in one scanner and a client in another due 
to the potentially deleterious effects of the clinical environment, although Bozarth 
(2011) seems enthused at this prospect. Perhaps appropriate technology will exist in 
the future where a scanner may be simply a room that both may work in, for now 
though we can work only with the evidence available. 
 
Cognitive affective and social psychology research are increasingly becoming 
integrated with the neurobiological study of emotion, depression and anxiety under 
the banner of the social, cognitive and affective neurosciences (Frewen, Dozois, & 
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Lanius, 2008). Research on the mechanisms of change through neuro-imaging is still 
in its infancy with the general assumption that clinical outcomes can be attributed to 
common factors such as the therapeutic alliance and specific factors of different 
therapeutic techniques.  
 
Frewen, Dozois, & Lanius (2008) state that it is possible that the effects of the 
therapeutic alliance have their own substrates (signatures) or that both common and 
specific factors may act on similar neural mechanisms. 
 
Carter (2003) warns that it is dangerous territory to relate specific brain areas or brain 
systems to particular constructs within psychotherapeutic approaches. This however 
has been done by many researchers. Carrig & Kolden (2009) argue that as long as 
the constructs of interest can be associated reliably with patterns of brain activation, 
fMRI is potentially valuable, assuming that the task selected for use during scanning 
is appropriate for testing a hypothesis. The types of tasks used may be related to 
therapeutic constructs, but are not synonymous with therapy itself making 
extrapolation risky as Carter suggests. 
 
Walter, Berger & Schnell (2009) make explicit some of the ethical considerations; 
such as if treatment models may become available but are too expensive. They 
comfort themselves that reports in the media of what scanning techniques such as 
fMRI tell us are exaggerated, so there is time to consider research findings and 
appropriate ethics before such knowledge is available. 
 
Walter, Berger and Schnell provide a good description of what fMRI can and cannot 
show us, urging that a good understanding of techniques is vital before trying to 
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interpret results. In this study I look only for evidence that has already been 
interpreted and to critique and apply this to a detailed review of theory. I am not 
trained to directly interpret scanning data, which is a complex process and involves 
correlation and synthesis of subject’s scans. 
 
fMRI  only measures the reaction of the vascular system induced by the mass action 
of neurons but cannot measure neuron activation itself. Therefore it cannot 
distinguish between neuron excitation and inhibition. To be clear, scans that show 
activity in a particular brain region only show activity and not the meaning of it. The 
data is interpreted against the proposed theory and hypothesis which has a bearing 
on the validity of conclusions drawn. Mapping is not precise and can only measure 
blood-oxygen-level-dependant levels (BOLD) and as such indicate where the brain is 
most actively using blood as a source of oxygen (Walter, Berger, & Schnell, 2009). 
This may be influenced by many things present in the scanning environment. 
Additionally group differences are what are usually reported and this cannot ethically 
be generalised to individuals. 
 
Advantages are that brain activity can now be mapped (although only indirectly) to 
functional brain systems during psychological experiments across the whole brain 
and that scanning is non-invasive, repeatable and standardisable (Walter et al, 
2009). Cohen (2005) points out the most important caution about fMRI is that it 
reveals a correlation between brain activity and task manipulation or behavioural 
response and cannot definitively establish a relationship between patterns of brain 
activity and a particular psychological function. 
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Linden (2006) in his review of functional neuro-imaging of psychotherapy effects and 
their methodological background recognises that therapeutic improvement of a 
complex disorder like depression is likely to be achieved through altered interactions 
between several brain areas rather than unidirectional changes in a single region.  
He suggests that fMRI also allows for predictions about changes in specific brain 
networks based on the psychological tests associated with particular theories. He 
cites Goldapple’s (2004) Positron Emission Topography (PET) study. This study, like 
most others looks at the effects of CBT and does not consider reasons for results 
from outside this therapeutic framework. There are social neuroscience studies that 
look at relational processes such as empathy which I will relate these findings to in 
gaining a broader perspective. 
 
The Neural Correlates of Depression. 
The neural correlates of depression have been investigated by many studies. Studies 
of depression show increased activation in the amygdala and hippocampus (emotion 
processing) with decreased activity in the Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) associated with 
rational thought (Cozolino, 2010).  Sharpley and Bitsika (2010) suggest that the 
amygdala enlarges and the PFC and hippocampus shrink either before or during the 
initial stages of depression, producing a more emotion-oriented response pattern in 
the depressed individual. Hence these are the areas we would expect to see 
changes in fMRI studies of therapy and emotion processing. 
 
This is often referred to as top down processing (PFC executive or thinking control) 
or bottom up (amygdala, hippocampus, limbic region) emotional reactivity (Cozolino, 
2010). This can be related to theories of how therapies work based on the original 
concepts and developments to theory. CT with its emphasis on the cognitive control 
17 
 
of emotion relates to top-down processing and PCT to bottom up processing through 
its emphasis on reducing threat through appropriate relationship conditions. Both 
theories highlight the interaction between cognition and affect as already shown, with 
different emphasis, but still implicating both types of processing. 
 
Whilst this is broadly representative of the literature reviewed in considering the 
neural correlates of depression (Cozolino, 2010; Cohen, 2005; Davidson, Pizzagalli, 
Nitschike, & Putnam, 2002; DeRubeis, Siegle, & Hollon, 2008; Moras, 2006; Toomey 
& Ecker, 2009) it belies the complexity of the brain and the mechanisms potentially at 
work in depression.  
 
Cohen (2005) suggests that the human brain is best understood as a confederation 
of mechanisms that usually act together, but sometimes may come into competition 
with one another. 
 
Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschike, & Putnam (2002) point out that one of the crucial 
issues underpinning research in affective neuroscience relating to depression is the 
heterogeneity of mood disorders. Depression may arise from many distinct causes 
and whilst the broad symptoms may share some similarities the underlying 
mechanisms may differ. Pathways into depression are likely to involve different 
neural circuits despite the fact that they have a set of symptoms that are partially 
shared.  This suggestion is supported by Clark, Chamberlain & Sahakian (2009) in 
their review evaluating progress in understanding neuro-cognitive mechanisms of 
depression. They state that a distributed neural circuit composed of multiple sectors 
of the prefrontal cortex in interaction with sub-cortical regions (striatum, thalamus) 
and temporal lobe structures (amygdala, hippocampus) are all implicated. They 
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stress that we still have a limited understanding of the neural structures relating to 
depression. However they conclude that the symptomology of depression suggests a 
processing bias towards negative aspects of the environment and that the amygdala 
is connected with multiple regions in the PFC which may allow top-down control of 
emotional behaviour.  
 
DeRubeis, Siegle & Hollon (2008) state that increased or sustained amygdala activity 
is understood to be central to depressive symptoms and that sustained emotional 
reactivity might result from decreased pre-frontal executive control.  The pre-frontal 
cortex is understood to exert an inhibitory effect on limbic regions such as the 
amygdala with a damping effect emotional reactivity.  
 
They consider two mechanisms that could be implicated in maintaining depressive 
functioning: 
a) Abnormally low pre-frontal cortex activity and the hypothesis of decreased pre-
frontal control stating that studies suggest that depressed individuals have 
decreased pre-frontal activity compared with healthy individuals.  
b) Abnormally increased and sustained limbic (especially amygdala) activity  
based on the idea that increased limbic activity interferes with pre-frontal 
regulatory function processes such as rumination that are seen to interfere 
with cognitive tasks in patients with depression. 
 
Davidson et al (2002) state that the amygdala has long been linked with negative 
affect but that more recent studies suggest that its role is more about directing 
attention to stimuli and requesting further processing of stimuli. Structurally the 
hippocampal changes may arise owing to neuronal loss through stress induced cell 
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loss or stress induced reduction in neuro-genesis (new neuronal growth).  Whether 
this is a cause or consequence of depression cannot be answered from the current 
data. We cannot yet specify which of the abnormalities may be primary (occurring 
first) and which may be secondary to activity in another brain region. They could also 
be related or independent.  
 
Davidson et al (p563) also explain that the Anterior Cingulated Cortex (ACC) is 
frequently activated in imaging studies of emotion partly because when emotion is 
elicited in the laboratory it produces a response conflict: 
"...a general expectation to behave unemotionally for science yet responses 
pulled by emotional challenge such as patterns of facial expressions are 
commonly reported by subjects."  
 
They argue that their review is evidence for a heterogeneous group of disorders 
rather than a single condition. 
 
 Moras (2006) in reviewing ways that Neuroscience may accelerate research in 
psychotherapy argues that practice relevant progress in neuroscience means 
findings that readily translate into more broadly effective and efficient psychological 
treatments than those now available. 
 
Neural Correlates of CT Therapy for Depression. 
Moras highlights Mayberg's limbic-cortical network model of brain processes 
suggesting that they maintain, if they do not cause major depression.  She suggests 
that preliminary findings (not fMRI) suggest that when observed at the level of brain 
processes mechanisms of change between CT and anti-depressant medication 
differ, and differ in ways that match different hypothesised causal mechanisms; CT 
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as top-down, with cortical changes occurring first whereas medication may trigger 
bottom up processing which changes limbic function leading to cortical changes. 
 
Moras concluded that observations of brain functioning using contemporary methods 
are consistent with the hypothesis that cognition, affect and behaviour can be 
simultaneously, rather than sequentially changed by interventions that initiate 
synaptic changes via different causal mechanisms.  
 
Toomey & Ecker, (2009, p124) state that "the interest of Neuroscientists in cognitive 
regulation of emotion lie in the view that emotionally intense implicit memory in the 
amygdala is indelible." If they are indelible the only strategy for such emotionality is 
enlisting another brain region; particularly the cortex to compete with, moderate and 
manage the responses of the amygdala and other implicit memory systems. They 
point out that relying on the cortex to exert a counteractive, regulating influence on 
symptoms driven by sub-cortical emotional brain centres is the strategy of Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy. 
 
Toomey & Ecker (p125) argue that studies show that "implicit memory is not indelible 
after all and can be changed rather than suppressed through an experience driven 
neurological process called reconsolidation." This unlocks an implicit memory circuit 
leaving it open to change rather than relying on a cognitive brain system to control it. 
They suggest that: 
"...because it is not yet apparent to neuroscientists how this can be used 
therapeutically in humans that the cortical regulation of emotion continues to be 
the therapeutic strategy studied by researchers and used by clinicians." (p131).  
 
They suggest that closer working between Neuroscience and Psychotherapy could 
help identify more reliable and effective methodologies and techniques.  
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The depression studies reviewed adopt cognitive models of mediation. None look at 
other therapeutic methods that may indicate a bottom up rather than top down 
mechanism of recovery despite findings that this may be the pathway in the case of 
some medications for depression.  
 
So in therapy for depression we may expect cognitive therapy to begin with cognitive 
brain areas, and PCT to begin with the development of the relationship and affective 
areas. But as both Beck and Rogers point to the importance of both cognitive and 
affective processes being interlinked it seems unreasonable to expect the two to be 
entirely divorced from each other. 
 
Neural Correlates of Theoretical Constructs Relating to Therapy. 
However there are additional theoretical constructs that may have a bearing on our 
understanding that are seen as important, if not sufficient by both therapies such as 
empathy and UPR. For this perspective we must turn to social affective 
neuroscience.  
 
Bozarth (2011, p110) states that three primary components of empathy were 
identified by Decety and Jackson (2004) in their examination of its functional 
architecture. These components include: 
"...the ability to share the experience of another, the cognitive capacity to 
understand it and the ability to simultaneously regulate one’s own feelings. That 
is to maintain the distinction between self and others feelings." 
 
This matches very well Roger’s descriptions of empathy. 
 
Most studies on empathy relate to empathy for physical pain (Singer & Lamm, 2009). 
Decety and Lamm (2006) describe the key areas indicated in empathy in fMRI 
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studies. They describe how brain areas linked with emotional processing and 
activation or movement are observed to be active in response to observing images of 
others in pain, or at risk of pain. The areas they highlight are the ACC, thalamus, 
amygdala and parts of the cortical network associated with movement such as the 
pre-motor cortex (Decety & Jackson, 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2006; Jackson, Meltzoff, 
& Decety, 2005; Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, & Kaube, 2004). They also mention 
the mirror system as part of the cortical network. Mirror neurons are described by 
Damasio (2004) as part of the process of experiencing the emotion of another. 
Decety and Lamm conclude that similar circuits are activated when experiencing 
emotions as when we perceive another experiencing that emotion. 
 
Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty & Kaube (2004) found using fMRI that empathy for pain 
involves the affective but not sensory components of pain. They reached this 
conclusion by comparing scan images of subjects receiving physical pain and 
witnessing their partner receive pain. They found that some areas were specific to 
receiving pain and that others were specific to perceiving pain in another person.  
The  bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, 
and cerebellum were activated when subjects received pain and also by a signal that 
a loved one experienced pain. AI and ACC activation correlated with individual 
empathy scores. They conclude that only the part of the pain network associated with 
its affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, is involved in empathy. Hence the 
AI, ACC, brainstem and cerebellum are understood to be involved in the processing 
of the affective component of pain.  The firsthand experience of pain and the 
knowledge that a partner is experiencing pain activates the same affective brain 
circuits which suggests that our own neural response reflects our partner’s negative 
affect (Singer & Lamm, 2009). 
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Singer & Lamm (2009) in a review of the literature on empathy research conclude 
that consistent evidence shows that sharing the emotions of others is associated with 
activation in neural structures that are also active during the firsthand experience of 
that emotion. They also state that one of the factors influencing empathy is the inter-
personal relationship between the empathizer and the other. 
 
They state that caution is required as to whether the observed involvement of AI or 
ACC is specifically related to empathy but that substantial empirical evidence 
suggests that shared neural activations are at the root of sharing feelings, 
sensations, and actions of others. They point out that additional research is required 
to clarify whether these activations are actually shared on the neural level and to 
what extent we share either the bodily sensations or only the affective consequences 
of another person’s experience.  
 
Decety and Lamm (2006) proposed a model in which bottom-up (i.e. direct matching 
between perception and action) and top-down (i.e. regulation, contextual appraisal 
and control) information processes are fundamentally intertwined in the generation 
and modulation of empathy. In this model, bottom-up processes account for direct 
emotion sharing which is automatically activated (unless inhibited) by perceptual 
input. On the other hand, executive functions implemented in the pre-frontal and 
cingulate cortex are seen to serve to regulate both cognition and emotion through 
selective attention and self-regulation. This meta-cognitive level is continuously 
updated by bottom-up information, and in return controls the lower level by providing 
top-down feedback. Thus top-down regulation through executive functions modulates 
lower levels and adds flexibility, making the individual less dependent on external 
cues. The meta-cognitive feedback loop also plays a crucial role in taking into 
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account one’s own mental competence in order to react (or not) to the affective 
states of others.  
 
Beauregard, Courtemanche, Paquette & St-Pierre (2009)  conducted an fMRI study 
to attempt to identify the neural correlates of unconditional love. Which I  relate to the 
Rogerian construct of UPR. They identified the following areas; the middle insula, 
superior parietal lobule, right periaqueductal gray, right globus pallidus (medial), right 
caudate nucleus (dorsal head), left ventral tegmental area and left rostro-dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex. These results were seen to suggest that unconditional love 
is controlled by a distinct neural network relative to that managing other emotions. 
They state that this network contains cerebral structures known to be involved in 
romantic love or maternal love. They also suggest that some of these structures 
represent key components of the brain's reward system.  
 
In this review of the literature I have critically evaluated the CT and PCT theories of 
causality and therapy of depression; the neural substrates of depression and how 
they may relate to theoretical concepts; what fMRI may offer including some 
limitations and what evidence neuroscience offers in considering how the therapies 
have been suggested to act on the brain in line with the aims set out in chapter 1. 
 
I will now describe and critically appraise the methodology of this study including 
detailing the underlying philosophy, providing a rationale for the study and 
considering ethics and issues of validity. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Methodology 
 
"...the object of thought becomes progressively clearer with this accumulation of 
different perspectives on it."  
(Berger & Luckman, 1967) 
 
Underlying Philosophy 
Recently Cooper & McLeod (2010) called for pluralistic researchers to add their 
voices to establishing what is effective for different clients, in different ways and 
different times. As I share their philosophy I have decided to accept their challenge in 
the small way I am able.  
 
Positivism and phenomenology are the two overarching perspectives that shape our 
overall understanding of research (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). I personally value a 
non-polarised view of research (Silverman, 2010) and will discuss in the validity 
section how they may be complimentary. I accept Rogers’ (1959, p185) idea that it is 
important to be very clear what ‘soil’ my thinking springs from and subscribe to 
McLeod’s (2001) view that methodology, epistemology and ontology are 
interconnected.  
 
Since all the major schools of therapy have been shown through research to be 
roughly equally effective (Cooper, 2008, 2010) I am interested in whether this is 
reflected in studies of neural processes underpinning studies of depression and 
therapy for depression. 
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My understanding of the phenomena to be investigated is rooted in my particular 
personal construct (Kelly, 1963) which includes learning through experience (Kolb in 
Petty, 2006) and through prior personal and academic exposure to both positivist and 
phenomenological perspectives. This exposure to psychological, neuro-scientific and 
learning theory necessarily affects my selection of and involvement with 
methodological process and causes me to adopt a pluralistic stance (Cooper & 
McLeod, 2007). I concur with Cooper and McLeod (2010, p14) that:  
"...perhaps now more than ever, there is a need for those who hold a pluralistic 
vision to articulate it as fully as possible and to look at how it can be developed 
and applied through research." 
 
The basic principle of pluralism in therapeutic terms is that there is unlikely to be one 
right approach that will be appropriate in all situations (Cooper & McLeod, 2007). 
This is aligned with postmodernist thinking (Lyotard, 1984 cited in Cooper and 
McLeod, 2007) and the idea that any substantial question admits of a variety of 
plausible but mutually conflicting responses (Rescher, 1993 cited in Cooper & 
McLeod, 2007). This has been extended to research in the social sciences (Petticrew 
& Roberts, 2006) where the value of interrogating data from multiple disciplines to 
better understand phenomena is stressed.  
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Rationale 
"Single studies can be seen as similar to single respondents in a survey. Each 
respondent may say important and contradictory things. By looking at the range 
of answers and how they vary and attempting to summarize them, learning is 
possible."  (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006, p15). 
 
There is potential in establishing support for the efficacy of multiple models of therapy 
to empower service users a greater choice of what suits them at a given time and 
supporting informed consent (BACP, 2010) by establishing underlying neural 
mechanisms implicated in therapy. 
 
McLeod (2003) points to the risks of contradiction or confusion from the inclusion of 
disparate methods of analysis.  
 
A realist synthesis methodology is derived from systematic reviews and as such the 
quality of a review depends on how well and inclusively the literature search is done 
as well as how well the studies are assessed and interpreted. Systematic reviews by 
their nature define criteria for selection and analysis of data with the aim of producing 
a synthesis of the current knowledge based on systematic, rigorous and repeatable 
steps (Timulak, 2008). Rather than use different methods of analysis the result of a 
realist synthesis is a narrative analysis. 
 
I suggest that psychotherapy and counselling are complex social interventions and 
that there is pluralistic data to evaluate from disparate sources. More traditional 
methods tend to contribute to entrenched schoolism (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006) with 
findings written and published in the language of a particular discipline or philosophy. 
This risks valid findings from other disciplines being ignored, misinterpreted or at 
worst misrepresented. 
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When deciding on a method of enquiry for the topic I considered several possibilities. 
Conducting field research did not seem an appropriate way forward as I have no 
training or access to fMRI scanners. I considered a study looking at therapist’s views 
of the relevance or otherwise of Neuroscience to therapy but felt that this would not 
get me closer to understanding the underlying neuroscience. My interest in the area 
was very strong and it is an area especially in humanistic therapies that is relatively 
underrepresented in the literature. I saw the potential to review a relatively broad 
spectrum of literature at a point in time when debates about the future of the 
profession of therapy are in full swing and felt that a review of the literature may have 
potential to contribute to the debate as well as my own interest and understanding. 
 
In initially contemplating research in neuroscience for psychotherapy I considered a 
systematic review. I was attracted by the rigour and repeatability criteria required in 
such a process due to my dislike of "bad science" (Goldacre, 2009) or claims based 
on uncritically tested hypotheses. This did not fit well with my pluralist philosophy or 
seeking to understand what lay behind the interpretations that systematic reviews 
make of the data. 
 
Conducting a traditional systematic review within the framework of a single 
therapeutic modality may highlight strengths and weaknesses of the research within 
that school but does not allow for the benefit of learning from the research already 
conducted in other disciplines. In remaining true to my pluralist position I did not want 
to potentially add support for only one school and actually counter my own pluralist 
position. 
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Realist review is a: 
"...logic of enquiry that is inherently pluralistic and flexible, it seeks to explain 
rather than judge and its main task in synthesis is one of refining theory to make 
progress in explanation." (Pawson, 2005, p32). 
 
Realist synthesis seemed the best match for my philosophical position and the blend 
of rigour with flexibility appealed to me and has helped me be thorough whilst open to 
different possibilities. In this way positivism and phenomenology can be seen as 
complimentary. 
 
Since part of my aim in conducting this study was to contribute to the contemporary 
debate it was important for my evidence to be as up to date as possible. Hence I 
chose to focus on fMRI as the most modern tool for neuro-imaging. 
 
Ethics: 
Ethical researchers in counselling and psychotherapy take into account the trust 
placed in them in practice and in research. This relates to other people involved in 
the research, the discovery and construction of new knowledge, how this is 
communicated and the application of research to practice (Bond, 2004). This is just 
as true of literature based studies as those involving human participants due to the 
potential to impact on the researcher (and their clients when this is a practitioner 
researcher) and to impact other researchers whose papers have been reviewed and 
future readers who may rely on the validity of the research. 
 
In a qualitative literature review one of the key concerns is the trustworthiness of the 
work. The potential knowledge that is produced by a literature review is dependent 
on the integrity and openness of the researcher (McLeod, 2011). I have aimed to 
work with the same ethical values as I would in therapeutic practice and considered 
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The Ethical Framework for Good Practice (BACP, 2010) and The Ethical Guidelines 
for Researching Counselling and Psychotherapy (2004) in reflecting on the design 
and process of the research in seeking to achieve a valid and fair appraisal of the 
texts under consideration. 
 
From the outset I have aimed at transparency, both as to my philosophical position 
and to providing clarity about how knowledge was gained (Petticrew & Roberts, 
2006). I have detailed my methodology, methods of data collection and analysis, and 
critically evaluated their purposivity (fitness of purpose for the question under 
consideration). I have aimed toward academic conventions and criteria of the critical 
appraisal and synthesis of information whilst bearing in mind that no research is 
perfect. Petticrew & Roberts emphasise the value of attempting to avoid excessive 
scrutiny that risks disregarding valid evidence of an intervention working through 
adopting an overly critical stance to the ways evidence is presented in different 
studies. This addresses ethical principles such as justice and wisdom (BACP, 2010). 
 
I have aimed to answer a research question that has relevance to the field of 
counselling and psychotherapy as an offer to join contemporary debate in the field. I 
have sought to open the debate rather than test a hypothesis. I hope to highlight 
some valid areas where further enquiry may be fruitful and beneficial for clients 
suffering from depression. Relevance is an ethical consideration for a practitioner 
researcher. As continuing study forms part of my continuing professional 
development it seems appropriate that this development should be in the direction of 
providing an enhanced service to my own clients and the clients of practitioners who 
may be influenced by my work. This relates to the ethical principles of beneficence 
and non-maleficence (BACP, 2010). 
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Another cornerstone of ethical practice is competence and this also applies to 
research. As Bond points out research studies require a higher level of competence if 
they involve complexity of design. The relative novelty of realist synthesis reviews 
and the methodological complexity they contain makes this a key consideration. In 
having my research proposal reviewed and approved by the university I have 
demonstrated my potential competence to undertake this study. My desire has been 
to develop new competence by stretching my ability whilst using supervision and 
personal reflection to ensure the integrity of my work.  
 
By selecting a methodology that includes requirements for rigour and accountability 
as well as flexibility the design of the study both matches the needs of the question 
and helps to ensure trustworthiness through the requirement to be openly reflexive 
and provide access to data. Additionally "the wide ranging data collection, data 
analysis and presentation minimise selection and observer bias" (Petticrew & 
Roberts, p127).  
 
The following section on validity demonstrates the ways I have managed the ethical 
considerations. 
 
Validity: 
Prior to beginning the study my expectation was that the search would uncover both 
quantitative and qualitative data. This fits my underlying philosophical position of 
adopting a non-polarised view of research; that positivism and phenomenology are 
complimentary rather than competing positions. I was open to using both quantitative 
and qualitative methods dependant on what was appropriate to the studies found. In 
fact the result was that only qualitative data was recovered. 
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McLeod (2011) highlights some of the difficulties of the concept of validity relating to 
qualitative research. He suggests that in quantitative research there is a relatively 
broad consensus as to what makes a piece of research good but that this is not yet 
the case with qualitative research. He proposes some guidelines for evaluating the 
credibility of qualitative work which I have considered along with Trochin’s (2006) 
description of Lincoln and Guba’s four evaluative criteria. 
 
As McLeod suggests is appropriate I built in validity checks from the design stage by 
selecting a form of systematic review with a clear emphasis on repeatability and 
providing a clear audit trail. I have provided potential readers with as much access to 
data as possible by providing clear tables of the databases and search terms used 
and detailed records of the studies recovered by database and how I have divided 
these into logical categories based on the aims for the research. 
 
I have kept the findings of the study separate from the discussion and made it clear 
where in this document each of the logical categories has been used so that the 
reader can be clear what I have found and analysed in this study. I have aimed to 
come to specific and warrantable conclusions. 
 
I have taken reflexivity very seriously and been clear and open as to my position at 
the outset and how this has changed as a result of the research process. 
 
I have adopted a critical stance to the studies and the literature and considered 
alternative interpretations of the data paying close attention to replicability, bias and 
validity. 
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I take the stance that each researcher brings their own perspective to the study 
(Trochin, 2006). So whilst I have made every attempt to secure validity through the 
systemising of my enquiry I hold the view that it would be possible for another 
researcher to perform the same searches and retrieve different studies based on 
their understanding of the phenomena under investigation and of the terms used. 
This was particularly clear to me at the point where I reviewed abstracts for a match 
against inclusion and exclusion criteria. Applying a quantitative analysis to 
numerically code matches may have made an exact repetition more possible but I 
have leant towards Lincoln and Guba’s dependability concept as described by 
Trochin (2006); 
 "we can’t actually measure the same thing twice and that dependability relies on the 
researcher’s ability to account for the ever changing context of the research process". 
 
I have attempted to do this by maintaining a research diary to aid my reflexive 
process through the inductive aspects of the search and synthesising the results as 
well as careful record and log keeping of search terms, databases and results. 
 
Epoche or bracketing is the theoretical process of suspending judgement (McLeod, 
2003). I have engaged in this process as far as I am able. I am aware that to some 
degree my own perspective will be evident as I can never wholly sit outside it. . 
Discussing work with my supervisor has helped in this process through aiding 
reflection on my perspective. 
 
Since the participants in my study are items of literature they cannot comment on the 
credibility of my findings. Internal validity (in the quantitative sense) does not apply 
either since I am not directly trying to establish a causal relationship within this study. 
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I review theories as background context in which studies are generalized in order to 
make a critical appraisal of misinterpretation or over extrapolation from these studies.  
 
I have been informed by Pawson et al’s (2005, p 24) "steps in a realist review" and 
Petticrew and Roberts (2006, p170) "narrative synthesis in three steps". Careful 
documenting and checking and re-checking of findings enhance the likelihood of 
confirmability of my findings. I have actively searched for negative instances and 
inconsistencies within the literature reviewed and considered the potential for bias or 
distortion as proposed by Trochin. In working toward confirmability I have 
systematically followed up citations in the literature reviewed in order to reduce the 
potential for distortion. I was keen to allow the evidence that the studies provided to 
answer the research question rather than direct the outcome. This legacy of 
phenomenological philosophy demonstrates how ideas from positivism and 
phenomenology can be complimentary in aiming at a valid conclusion.  
 
Transferability of this method of researching in counselling and psychotherapy will be 
determined by how well I have defined and described the process of research and 
the context in which it has taken place. To this end I have paid attention to making 
explicit my underlying philosophy, definitions of constructs under consideration and 
outlining a clear methodology with attention to validity. As such another researcher 
may be able to adopt the same design and transfer it to another context.  
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Data Collection 
In acquiring data for a realist synthesis "the search itself is a complex process" 
(Pawson, 2005, p28). It was clear that my study would need to consider a great deal 
of context in terms of theory and evidence from heterogeneous literature. This had 
implications on the work required to define the main review question and sub-
questions (aims). I revisited the question many times before beginning the search in 
an attempt to finely balance the need for a focussed question with openness to 
acquiring data from heterogeneous sources. This made the inclusion criteria complex 
and required "inductive modification of these criteria based on the evidence found 
during the search process" (Pawson, 2005, p29). This required purposive rather than 
probability sampling; choosing literature based on its relevance to the research 
question and potential to add to understanding rather than on its internal validity 
(Pawson, 2005, p29).  
 
Thus there could not be a pre-defined set of key search terms; literature covering 
different concepts required searching for different key words and in different places. 
For example electronic database searching produced very little in terms of the 
person-centred approach to depression or psychopathology with literature on this 
area being accessible via the open source of Google Scholar and in most quantity 
through the hand searching of journals and books. Hence the search process itself 
was complex, time consuming and difficult to manage.  
 
I made very careful use of forms to capture when, where and how I had located items 
for the sake of validity and reliability, but also because this had a potential bearing on 
my study findings at least in terms of publication bias. 
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It was necessary for me to conduct several types of search: 
a) Electronic database search 
b) Google Scholar search of key terms 
c) Hand search of book chapters, indexes and contents lists 
d) Hand Search of Journals / professional associations websites 
e) Grey literature searching of websites of writers mentioned in other texts and 
texts already in my collection. 
f) Following up references and citations within the studies my search uncovered 
in order to check the ways they have been interpreted. 
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Database Search: Table 1: Inclusion and exclusion criteria  
Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria 
Aim 1) Defining Depression Drug Therapy or other named therapy. 
Aim 2) Cognitive, Affective or 
Interpersonal Neuroscience: Neural 
Correlates, substrates, signatures of 
depression. 
Neural correlates of other disorders 
 
 
 
Aim 5)  fMRI studies of CT or PCT for 
depression 
Studies based on PET scan, MRI, CT 
scans etc 
Aim 3) CT theory of causality depression 
PCT theory of incongruence / 
vulnerability 
Theory of causality of anxiety or other 
disorders 
Aim 4) CT theory of therapy for 
depression 
PCT theory of therapy for 
incongruence/vulnerability 
Theory of therapy for anxiety or other 
disorders 
Aim 4) Developments to CT or PCT 
theories related to depression * 
Developments to other therapies* 
Aim 4) Cognitive, Affective or 
Interpersonal Neuroscience Theory 
relating to CT Psychotherapy or PCT 
Cognitive, Affective or Interpersonal 
Neuroscience related to other therapies 
Individual Therapy (as opposed to 
couples or family) 
Not = Individual Therapy 
Symptom / Presenting issue 
 = Depression 
Symptom / Presenting issue not 
 = Depression  
(e.g. Schizophrenia, Bi-Polar Disorder, 
Anxiety) 
Age of study Up to august 2011 
Available in English Not available in English  
 
An initial search was trialled in January 2011 to aid in the design of search forms. 
The search was undertaken on the 17th and 18th of May and the 8th, 11th, 13th and 
14th of July 2011. Because of the heterogeneous nature of the studies to be located I 
devised a database search form to keep a log of the searches. These can be found 
in appendix 2. 
Table 2 overleaf is a record of the databases searched, the search terms used and 
the results of the searches. 
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Table 2: Record of Searches 
Database Search terms used Number of papers 
retrieved - total 84 
EbscoHost 
CINHAL plus with full 
text 
MEDLINE 
PsycArticles 
PsycBOOKS 
PsycINFO 
socINDEX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘’cognitive behaviour therapy fmri 
depression’’ 
14
th
 July 2011 
 
 
‘’Non directive therapy fMRI 
depression’’ 11
th
 july 2011 
 
‘’Counselling neuroscience’’ 
 
‘’Psychotherapy fMRI depression’’ 
 
‘’Humanistic therapy fMRI depression’’ 
 
‘’Psychotherapy neuroscience 
depression’’ 
 
‘’person-centred psychopathology’’ 
 
‘’client incongruence person centred’’ 
 
 
5  
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
0 
 
5  
 
0 
 
5  
 
 
0 
 
0 
Campbell 
Collaboration 
 
13
th
 July 2011 
Browse search – social and human 
sciences 
- Psychology 
- Psychology 
- Clinical Psychology 
- Psychotherapy 
 
Advanced search using 
 
Counselling 
Psychotherapy 
Neuroscience in  
Depression 
Cognitive behav* 
 
(in all text) 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
ZETOC 
13
th
 July 2011 
‘’person centred counselling 
depression’’ 
‘’person centred incongruence’’ 
‘’person centred psychopathology’’ 
‘’cognitive behaviour therapy fMRI 
depression’’ 
‘’neuroscience therapy depression’’ 
‘’counselling neuroscience’’ 
’Humanistic therapy fMRI depression’’ 
No results 
 
1  
1  
1  
 
2 
 
3 
No records 
 
Cochrane Library  
Psychotherapy depression 
 
Neuroscience psychotherapy 
 
Counselling depression 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
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Index to Theses 
14
th
 July 2011 
Counselling and depression and 
Neuroscience 
Psychotherapy and depression 
neuroscience 
Counselling and depression and 
person centred 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Web of knowledge 
(including web of 
science and medline) 
14
th
 July 2011 
 
Neuroscience psychotherapy 
 
Cognitive behaviour therapy and fmri 
and depression 
(January 2011) 
 
Cognitive behavior therapy AND fMRI 
AND depression (in title ) 
 
Client incongruence AND person 
centred (in title) 
 
Person centred AND psychopathology 
(in title) 
 
Neuroscience AND therapy AND 
depression (in title) 
 
Neuroscience AND counselling AND 
depression (in title) 
 
Neuroscience AND psychotherapy 
AND depression 
 
Neuroscience and psychobiology 
 
11 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
2  
 
 
Wiley Online Library 
13
th
 July 2011 
‘’person centred counselling 
depression’’ 
 
‘’person centred incongruence’’ 
 
‘’person centred psychopathology’’ 
 
‘’cognitive behaviour therapy fmri 
depression’’ 
 
‘’neuroscience therapy depression’’ 
 
‘’counselling Neuroscience’’ 
 
 
0 
 
 
No results 
 
No results 
 
 
No results 
 
 
No results 
 
 
No results 
Science direct 
14
th
 July 2011 
Cognitive behaviour therapy fMRI 
depression 
 
Person centred therapy depression 
0 
 
 
0 
Biomed central 
14
th
 July 2011 
Psychotherapy neuroscience 
depression 
Neuroscience psychotherapy 
 
Cognitive behaviour therapy fMRI 
depression 
 
Non directive therapy fMRI depression 
 
6 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
No results 
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Counselling neuroscience 
 
Person centred psychopathology 
 
Client incongruence person centred 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
No results 
Pubmed Central 
14
th
 July 2011 
 
Pubmed 
11
th
 January 2011 
Cognitive behaviour therapy fMRI 
depression 
 
Cognitive behaviour therapy and fmri 
and depression 
 
2 
 
 
5 
JSTOR 
 
fMRI cognitive behaviour therapy  
 
fMRI depression 
 
Psychotherapy, depression, fMRI 
 
Non directive counselling 
 
Psychotherapy effectiveness fMRI 
 
fMRI empathy 
 
fMRI Humanistic therapy 
 
fMRI supportive relationship 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Google Scholar 
17
th
 May 2011 
 
July 8
th
 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
20
th
 June 2011 
 
 
 
27
th
 September 2011 
‘’cognitive behaviour therapy fMRI 
depression’’ 
 
person centred Client incongruence 
 
person-centred therapy and 
depression 
 
Cognitive behaviour therapy core 
concepts 
 
 
Neuroscience empathy 
fMRI empathy 
4 
 
 
12 
 
 
4 
 
 
1 (from which I located Beck’s 
original papers in the references x 
3) 
 
5 
 
Grey lit search – 
book indexes 
 
Depression 
Incongruence 
Neurotic 
 
Author websites (N Rogers) 
 
NICE depression guidelines 
ICD10 Depression 
DSM1V 
0 
Did not complete – sufficient in 
original theory 
 
4 
 
1 
2 
1 
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Data Analysis 
Methods of analysis: A narrative Analysis in 3 stages 
84 papers were retrieved and separated into the following broad categories to 
correlate with the study aims as described in chapter 1: (Papers retained and 
reviewed :) 
1) Defining depression  (4 papers) (NICE, LSE, ICD-10, DSM-IV) 
2) Cognitive Therapy Theory (8 papers and 1 book) (Beck, The Current State of 
Cognitive Therapy: A 40 Year Retrospective, 2005) (Beck, The Evolution of 
The Cognitive Model of depression and its Neurobiological correlates, 2008) 
(Beck, Thinking and Depression: I Idiosyncratic Content and Cognitive 
Distortions, 1963) (Beck, Thinking and Depression: II Theory and Therapy, 
1964) (Beevers, 2005) (Clark & Beck, 2010) (Morley & Moran, 2011) 
(Westbrook, 2011) (Wright, 2006)  
3) Person Centred Theory (3 papers)  (Rogers C. , A Theory of Therapy, 
Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships as Developed in the Client-
Centred Framework., 1959) (Rogers C. , In Retrospect: Forty-Six Years, 1974) 
(Rogers C. R., 1979) (1 book– Mearns & Thorne, 2007) 
4) What Neuroscience offers psychotherapy and understanding fMRI (10 
(Fonagy, 2004), (Carrig & Kolden, 2009) (Cohen, 2005) (Frewen, Dozois, & 
Lanius, 2008) (Hoag & Defenbacher, 1988), (Sharpley & Bitsika, 2010), 
(Toomey & Ecker, 2009) (Walter, Berger, & Schnell, 2009) (Kumari, 2006) 
(Linden, 2006) (Motschnig-Pitrik, 2008) 
5) Neural correlates of depression (5 papers) (Clark, Chamberlain, & Sahakian, 
2009), (Toomey & Ecker, 2009), (Moras, 2006), (DeRubeis, Siegle, & Hollon, 
2008), (Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschike, & Putnam, 2002) 
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6) fMRI studies of therapy or therapeutic concepts (8 papers) (Decety & Jackson, 
A Social-Neuroscience Perspective on Empathy, 2006) (Decety & Lamm, 
Human Empathy Through the Lens of Social Neuroscience, 2006) (Jackson, 
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005) (Decety & Lamm, 2006) (Singer & Lamm, The 
Social Neuroscience of Empathy, 2009) (Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, & 
Kaube, 2004) (Goldapple, et al., 2004) (Siegle, Carter, & Thase, 2006) 
(Ritchey, Dolcos, Eddington, Strauman, & Cabeza, 2011)  PLUS – 1 PET 
study found from references searching (Goldapple, et al., 2004) 
7) Neural correlates of empathy: (Decety & Jackson, 2006) (Jackson, Meltzoff, & 
Decety, 2005) (Singer & Lamm, The Social Neuroscience of Empathy, 2009) 
(Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, & Kaube, 2004) (Decety & Lamm, 2006). 
8) Neural Correlates of UPR: (Beauregard, Courtemanche, Paquette, & St-
Pierre, 2009) 
9) Developments to CT and PCT theory and therapy (3 papers) Gendlin (1996, 
1996) (Perry (1959) , Kirtner & Cartwright (1958). 
 
At this point papers that did not fit the categories were re-assessed for suitability to 
the focus of the study and 47 papers were categorised as not relevant to the 
research question and aims and objectives to warrant further consideration in line 
with purposive sampling. *Following a review of my aims in relation to better 
focussing on the research question I decided to remove the category of 
developments to CT and PCT theory and therapy as although this area held great 
interest to me it did not specifically add to answering the research question. 
 
Due to the paucity of the results of the searches for Person-Centred studies I 
searched book indexes in PCT literature. This still returned no results for depression. 
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Re-visiting original theory led to a new search for the terms incongruence, 
vulnerability and neurosis. Original theory provided sufficient information to address 
the review question and aims so potential additional literature was not sought. 
 
a) Narrative analysis - common themes: 
I undertook a meta-ethnography for the qualitative studies (exploring the 
relationships and differences between study findings and the extent to which they 
reflect common, higher order themes). 
 
I conducted this analysis by creating tables that allowed me to cross reference key 
quotations and concepts from the papers reviewed. These tables can be found in 
appendix 1. 
 
b) Analyzing the findings within each of the categories 
I was then able to review and critically appraise the findings within each of the 
categories and relate them to the aims of the study. This enabled me to allocate the 
narrative analysis a place within the structure of the study as indicated within the 
aims in chapter 1 in order that it contributed in a logical way to critically answering the 
review question. 
 
The CT and PCT therapy categories were interrogated for key principles and 
concepts and these were mapped against each other to determine common higher 
order themes and differences that may be expected in neural substrates. This was a 
time-consuming and painstaking activity requiring several re-readings of the key 
papers.  
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I also represented some of the key features in a table for ease of presentation and 
understanding of the relationships and common higher order themes.  This can be 
located in appendix 1 (table 3) and visually represents the common themes that I 
evidenced from CT and PCT theory of causality of depression. 
 
c) Synthesising the findings across all included studies 
Synthesising the findings across all of the studies in order to answer the review 
question forms the basis for chapter four, which follows. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Findings 
 
The findings in this study are drawn from the literature recovered relating to the aims 
as set out in the introduction and critically appraised in the literature review. I will 
provide a summary of the findings here. 
 
The first aim of this study was to provide a working definition of depression. In 
reviewing literature from CT theory, PCT theory, neuroscience from cognitive, social 
and affective perspectives and fMRI studies it is clear that we do not have a single 
definition of depression. However I was able to arrive at a working definition inclusive 
enough for the purposes of the study. Depression is depressed mood or loss of 
pleasure in most activities that persists for more than two weeks and varying in the 
number and severity of symptoms. It can include both cognitive and affective 
symptoms. 
 
The second aim of the study was to establish what brain areas CT and PCT theories 
of depression should be expected to relate to in the causality of depression.  
 
Both CT and PCT theories make explicit statements about the interplay of cognition 
and affect. The full mapping including extracts from original theory can be found in 
appendix 1 along with Table 3 which more simply illustrates the relationships 
between themes in the theories. In summary both theories suggest that both 
cognitive and affective areas should be expected to be observed at work in the 
causality of depression. 
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The third aim of the study was to understand how each theory proposes recovery 
from depression is achieved through therapy and relate this to brain areas indicated 
by neuroscience to be indicated in depression. The mapping documents referred to 
above are available in appendix 1 and provides evidence from original theory of the 
common themes. The literature review considers how neuroscience and therapeutic 
concepts of depression relate.  
  
Both therapies can be seen to address cognitive and affective processes and as 
such we would expect both to be visible in neuroscience evidence. There are some 
key differences in the emphasis each theory places on either cognitive or affective 
processes.  So in therapy of depression we may expect cognitive therapy to begin 
with cognitive brain areas, and PCT to begin with the development of the relationship 
and affective areas. But as both Beck and Rogers point to the importance of both 
cognitive and affective processes being interlinked it seems unreasonable to expect 
the two to be entirely divorced from each other. 
 
One key difference arises in the directiveness of the therapist which is directly related 
to the underlying philosophies of each of the therapies. CT takes an educative stance 
where PCT takes an exploratory stance to engaging both cognitive and affective 
processes. 
 
The fourth aim of the study was to consider what fMRI offers us in understanding CT 
and PCT for depression.  Some limitations to fMRI and the ways it is used were 
discovered including its use to test hypothesis within ‘schools’ and technological 
limitations. 
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The fifth aim was to understand neuroscience perspectives on depression and relate 
these to the theoretical constructs of CT and PCT. 
 
Neuroscience demonstrates that both cognitive (top-down) and affective (bottom-up) 
processes are implicated in therapy of depression using CT therapy. It cannot yet tell 
us which are primary either in the causes of or recovery from depression as the 
technologies available are not sensitive enough to provide this information. 
 
All domains of neuroscience reviewed concur that both cognitive and affective 
processes are involved in depression and recovery from depression through CT 
therapy.  
 
No neuro-imaging studies of PCT for depression were recovered. Studies relating to 
therapeutic concepts such as empathy and unconditional love (agape) related to 
social rather than therapeutic context. No studies were recovered for relational 
genuineness or congruence. 
 
fMRI studies of CT, depression, empathy and UPR indicate some shared and some 
discrete neural mechanisms. The ACC is indicated in all studies. Studies of CT 
compared to drug therapy are interpreted to show that drug therapy operates through 
bottom up (affective changes) and that CT operates through top down (cognitive 
changes) in line with CT theory of the cognitive control of emotion. 
 
The final aim of the study was to answer the review question through a narrative 
synthesis which is partly achieved through the literature review (chapter 2) and in the 
following discussion.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Discussion 
 
In seeking to answer the research question literature from heterogeneous sources 
was utilised in addressing the six aims set out in the introduction. I will discuss how 
each of the aims were achieved and synthesise the findings of these six aims, 
critically discussing them in relation to the literature review in order to answer the 
review question: 
 
What does Neuroscience offer us in understanding Cognitive Therapy and 
Person-Centred Therapy for Depression? 
 
Aims one to four of this study were primarily focussed on gathering appropriate 
background or context for the detailed review of neuro-scientific fMRI scans of 
therapy and therapeutic concepts. Aims five and six were specifically aimed at 
answering the review question. 
 
Aim one was addressed through reviewing literature from UK policies relating to the 
treatment of depression, and from manuals of diagnostic criteria as well as the 
descriptions of depression in studies reviewed. This showed that depression as a 
condition contained both cognitive and affective symptoms. 
 
Through reviewing the original theories of Beck and Rogers to identify common 
themes and differences it is clear that both theories consider cognitive and affective 
processes in the causality of depression. Table 3 (appendix 1) demonstrates the 
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ways core statements of each theoretician support this assertion. Beck’s concept of 
cognitive schemas containing dysfunctional attitudes can be seen to relate to Rogers’ 
concept of conditions of worth. In this way this deeply held vulnerability, beyond 
immediate awareness can be seen as the result of a cognitive process of distorting 
experience. 
 
This cognitive vulnerability can be linked to attentional bias explicitly mentioned by 
each author. Beck conceives of this as a bias toward negatively based interpretations 
and Rogers as a bias toward the perceived wishes of others. In either case the result 
is seen as having an affective consequence which can be termed depression. 
 
Hence aim two of the study to define the causality of depression as proposed by CT 
and PCT in order to ascertain whether we should expect different or similar neural 
mechanisms is answered. Both theories implicate both cognitive and affective 
processes suggesting similar underlying neural mechanisms. 
 
In evaluating CT and PCT theories of therapy for depression towards aim three (to 
understand if we should expect different or similar neural pathways for recovery from 
depression) the original theories were mapped and compared for common and 
distinct themes. This mapping can be found in appendix 1 (table 5) and relies on 
original theories and later explanations and developments by writers from each 
school. 
 
There are distinct differences in the role the therapist takes in each therapy. In CT 
there is "greater activity by the therapist, operationalizing the specific procedures, 
setting goals for each session as well as for the long term" (Beck, 2005, p955), 
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whereas in PCT "The same conditions are regarded as sufficient for therapy, 
regardless of the particular characteristics of the client" (Rogers, 1959, p213).  
 
This initially seems to suggest different processes and does not make distinct either 
cognitive or affective involvement. In order to understand this in terms of the aims it 
was necessary to look at the desired outcomes of therapy. 
 
In relation to cognitive processes there are some close matches such as Beck’s view 
that "the individual is able to orient himself in relation to time and space and to 
categorize his experiences in a meaningful way" (1964, p562) with Rogers’ "aware of 
space time anchorage of facts, dominated by facts not concepts, ...tests his 
inferences and abstractions against reality" (1959, p206). Both seem to be describing 
a top-down cognitive process that results in reduced depression.  
 
Another key aspect considered was the relationship between therapist and client in 
each therapeutic orientation. As demonstrated in the literature review both CT and 
PCT can be shown to value empathy, UPR and genuiness. Whilst the therapies differ 
as to the emphasis they place on this, for the purposes of addressing this aim it can 
be suggested that both therapies can be expected to affect similar affective 
mechanisms. The key difference then, is in the emphasis in CT of a cognitive route 
out of depression and the emphasis in PCT on the role of a relationship in which 
affective threat is minimised in order to provide an appropriate environment for the 
client to choose their own pathway. 
 
What may to a lay observer be seen to be very different philosophies and models of 
depression can both be shown to include both cognitive and affective processes. 
51 
 
Hence in neuroscience we may expect to see similar neural circuitry in the causes of 
and therapy for depression. 
 
In considering aim four of what fMRI studies offer us in understanding CT and PCT 
for depression the literature review addresses some of the strengths and limitations 
of this technology. A key point to stress is that whilst fMRI shows activity in the brain 
it cannot indicate which activity is primary therefore cannot indicate if cognitive 
processes or affective processes occur first. This weakens the inferences that may 
be drawn from scanning data. Additionally there appears to be a discrepancy 
between the way findings are reported in their academic context and how they are 
represented to the lay public. This is important to note since policy makers 
responsible for commissioning therapy provision are unlikely to have a detailed 
knowledge of the limitations of scanning techniques and their decisions may 
therefore be inappropriately influenced where studies do not make this limitation 
explicit. 
 
Seeking papers to understand the applicability of fMRI scanning data to 
psychotherapy revealed this potential weakness strengthening the case for the 
validity of pluralistic research in a realist synthesis. The emphasis this methodology 
places on context led to wide ranging search criteria covering background and 
context as well as specific fMRI evidence to answer the review question fully. 
 
The fifth aim of the study was to answer the review question. This involved seeking 
fMRI studies across the fields of cognitive, affective and social neuroscience. 
Seeking only fMRI data limited the field of enquiry but drew attention to the way in 
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which previous synthesis of may have lead to a lay belief that more evidence exists 
than is in fact available.  
 
Aiming to understand the neural correlates of depression relied on older studies and 
it should be noted that very few were fMRI studies. Review studies of neuroscience 
and its potential for psychotherapy by Kumari (2006) and Linden (2006) explicitly 
separate out the broad spectrum of techniques and therapies used in study tables 
and then provide a narrative synthesis of the results they valuably make the 
distinction between scanning methods clear.  
 
In the literature reviews of the single studies evidence from multiple scanning 
techniques are used to provide context without making explicit that different scanning 
techniques have been used in the studies referred to. This is only revealed by a 
thorough read through of the references and recourse to the review tables in the 
studies by Kumari and Linden. Aiming to synthesise the results of studies from 
different disorders and treatments (therapies and medications) and different scanning 
techniques risk conflating results to imply a clearer answer than is currently available 
from the data. 
 
Reviewing heterogeneous literature did however yield some answers to 
understanding the neural correlates of depression and therapy for depression as 
proposed by neuroscience. 
 
The studies reviewed suggest that there are two key systems in the brain responsible 
for top-down (rational thinking) and bottom-up (emotional processing) and that these 
react to each other. Since studies tend to test a hypothesis from within a single 
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school of therapy there is the increased risk that conclusions are drawn from within 
that framework. Studies of CT suggest that cognitive and affective area activation 
indicates the cognitive control of emotion when if we take an alternate stance it could 
equally indicate relationship elements and activation of emotional areas. Either could 
be related to excitory or inhibitory processes.  
 
The alternate hypothesis suggested by DeRubeis et al (2008) was not tested in the 
literature reviewed. This hypothesis that abnormally increased bottom-up activity 
interferes with top-down processing cognitive tasks is not considered in the studies 
despite Goldapple’s (2004) PET study where anti-depressant medication is seen to 
work in this way. 
 
The ACC is seen to be active in all of the studies of depression and therapy for 
depression interpreted by Davidson et al (2002) as suggesting a response conflict 
caused by subjects being pulled to behave in two different ways due to the 
environment.  
 
Studies of empathy and studies of depression and therapy for depression all include 
areas of the PFC, thalamus and limbic region such as the amygdala and 
hippocampus. The therapeutic studies relate to CT and no studies were recovered 
relating to PCT.  
 
Social Affective Neuroscience has conducted fMRI studies, specifically related to 
empathy but in terms of a social rather than therapeutic process. Whilst it indicates 
that some of the same neural structures are at work as are observed in depression 
and therapy for depression this has yet to be tested experimentally in relation to the 
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potential effects of the receiver (or giver) of therapeutic empathy. PFC and limbic 
regions are both discussed by Decety & Lamm (2006) and as such both top-down 
and bottom-up processing has been suggested in empathy as well as in CT for 
depression. In CT for depression this is interpreted as cognitive control of emotion. 
 
A major limitation of this study was the failure to locate neuro-imaging studies of PCT 
for depression. Studies relating to therapeutic concepts such as empathy and 
unconditional love (agape) were sought and recovered but related to social rather 
than therapeutic context. No studies were recovered for relational genuineness or 
congruence. This has an impact on the inferences made from the studies that are 
found. On one hand the approach of conducting a realist synthesis made possible 
the inclusion of heterogeneous data and highlights areas for future research. On the 
other hand lack of specific evidence in this therapeutic framework makes 
interpretation speculative at best.  
 
The final aim of this study was to synthesise the findings in order to answer the 
review question: 
 
What does Neuroscience offer us in understanding Cognitive Therapy and 
Person-Centred Therapy for Depression? 
 
If as Moras suggests that practice relevant progress means findings that translate 
into more effective and efficient treatments it is important to consider the current 
neuroscience evidence in this light. 
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Neuroscience offers us concepts and theories about depression that to some degree 
match constructs from psychotherapy. There has been a weighting toward cognitive 
control of emotion when examining therapeutic constructs in depression with little 
attention paid to the potential of recruiting the affective neural processes in 
depression in a positive way. This seems due to the lack of consideration of alternate 
therapeutic models, or the relevance of the relational aspects of CT despite the fact 
that this bottom-up processing has been demonstrated in drug therapies for 
depression. I note a limitation in my own search strategy in not explicitly searching for 
neuroscience studies relating the therapeutic relationship in CT. 
 
Synergy can be found between the evidence considered across neuro-scientific 
disciplines such as cognitive, affective and social neuroscience with the concepts of 
both CT and PCT theory utilising a realist perspective which necessitates drawing 
meaning from heterogeneous areas of research.  
 
However as Fonagy (2004, p357) stated; "there is a significant risk that the evidence 
base we compile for psychotherapy will be based on professional priorities rather 
than criteria important to users". Since the findings of this study indicate that to some 
degree similar neural structures are involved in both types of therapy considered, and 
that despite their different philosophies both have been shown to have a similar effect 
(Cooper, 2008) perhaps at least part of the answer in focussing future research 
would be to better understand the priorities and personal philosophies of potential 
service users.  
 
If different theories of causality are so similar, and methods differ based mostly on 
philosophy perhaps a match to the clients own philosophy, ideas and understanding 
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of how their difficulties arose and how they prefer to tackle them may be a predictor 
of outcome. Both therapies rely on the ability of client and therapist to build an 
empathic, non-judgemental and congruent relationship but this is not reflected in 
neuroscience studies.  
 
Perhaps as Moras concluded the findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
cognition affect and behaviour are changed simultaneously rather than sequentially. 
This is a hypothesis advanced by Rogers (1979, p7) 
 "the transformation of one state to another is a sudden shift, a non-linear event, 
in which many factors act on each other at once. It is especially interesting to 
me that this has already been demonstrated in investigating Gendlin’s concept 
of experiencing." 
 
To allow research to become dominant in one area carries the potential to limit client 
choice. This is especially true when evidence is not being generated for alternative 
treatments which are then not funded on the NHS leaving only those who can afford 
a humanistic alternative with the ability to access it. This contravenes the ethical 
principle of justice (BACP, 2010). 
 
Ultimately the answer to the review question is that neuroscience currently offers us 
less evidence than may be supposed by lay observers due to the limitations of 
technology and the limitations of research that is conducted within schools rather 
than pluralistically. Further research is needed in order to more reliably apply the 
concepts of neuroscience to CT and PCT for depression. 
 
It is possible different pathways out of depression exist, or that different therapies use 
different pathways to achieve the same end results. Thus on the basis of 
neuroscience evidence we are not able to reliably state whether common or discrete 
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factors in therapy are responsible for the relatively equal effectiveness demonstrated 
by outcome studies (Cooper, 2008). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Conclusions 
 
"There are more questions than answers.  And the more I find out the less I 
know" 
(Nash, 1972) 
 
This study points to some gaps in our current knowledge which suggest directions for 
future research. This is important for advancing understanding of Neuroscience, CT 
and PCT. If ways can be found in which more pluralistic methods can be used then a 
better overall understanding which respects individuals chosen methods may be 
possible. 
 
Whilst there are clear weaknesses to what can be extrapolated from fMRI scans 
there is a proliferation of research in this area. This research spans the disciplines of 
psychotherapy, cognitive, affective and social neuroscience but appears to currently 
take place in schools that are largely separate. This is creating gaps in knowledge in 
each area and risks inappropriate extrapolation in policy decisions which potentially 
disadvantages service users who have a preference other than CT, or who have tried 
CT and found it ineffective for them. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research: 
This study has identified some specific gaps which indicate a need for further 
research and in particular pluralistic research aimed at integrating the findings of 
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different disciplines whilst remaining open to the possibility of the value of each 
discipline.  
 
There is a need for fMRI studies to compare therapies for depression, rather than 
only comparing therapies to drugs. If fMRI data indicates the same neural pathways 
for each therapy then there is not sufficient evidence to distinguish their effectiveness 
at a neural level. This allows for the consideration of the alternate hypothesis of 
bottom-up processing interfering with cognition as proposed by DeRubeis et al. 
Whilst both CT and PCT have been shown to share common themes suggesting 
both have impact on similar neural processes this has yet to be demonstrated by 
research. 
 
Closer working between neuroscientists and psychotherapists to define appropriate 
research methods may prove fruitful for both disciplines as suggested by Toomey 
and Ecker (2009) and lead to more available and effective treatments as proposed by 
Moras. 
 
A potential limitation to the above suggestions is the caveat that scanning techniques 
are not yet sensitive enough to directly observe or evaluate the process of therapy 
but only to infer causality from scanning prior to, at intervals of and following therapy. 
However only looking in one direction will not allow other potential effects to be 
observed. 
 
Perhaps in the future technology will exist that is sufficiently unobtrusive as to allow 
imaging a therapist and client interactions without negatively impacting the 
therapeutic environment. Until this time we must avoid overstating the findings of 
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neuroscience for psychotherapy and broaden its horizons. We must also place value 
in other validated methods of research to pluralistically contribute to expanding 
knowledge.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Reflexive statement 
 
"No theory can be adequately understood without some knowledge of the 
cultural and personal soil from which it springs." 
Carl Rogers (1959, p185). 
 
I have chosen to include a reflexive statement due to Pawson et al’s (2005) 
insistence that the researcher’s openness to evidence and reflexivity form an integral 
part of the validity in a realist review. 
 
I am no different than other theoreticians or investigators in that my enquiry begins 
from observation and personal experience. I was brought up in a humanistic family 
with a high degree of personal responsibility coupled with respect for human 
diversity. I have had some challenging experiences in my life. In coping with some I 
have benefitted from medical interventions, such as surgery for my brain tumour and 
medication for resultant epilepsy. For other problems counselling and psychotherapy 
have been just as dramatically healing. I have developed an interest in how the brain 
works. I am also influenced by the biological theories of Richard Dawkins (2005) and 
by a distaste for uncritically accepted ‘truths’ or ‘bad science’ (Goldacre, 2009). 
 
My core therapeutic training is PCT. I have had Cognitive Therapy and benefitted 
greatly from both the relational aspects and exercises suggested by the therapist. 
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I have undertaken the majority of my therapeutic practice to date within the NHS, in 
primary care. There is a great deal of change and some tension caused by the active 
investment is CBT and the perceived disinvestment in non-manualised forms of 
therapy such as counselling. To some degree I see my research as translational; 
interpreting the different languages used and drawing out both common and distinct 
factors. 
 
Evidence based practice is a key principle in contemporary healthcare. I 
wholeheartedly approve of evidence which is why I am frustrated at the way that so 
much evidence seems to be discounted. Adopting a realist approach to the evidence 
fits my aim to be inclusive as well as open to pluralistic outcomes. 
 
The process of research has been a process of learning. I held the view that 
neuroscience may be able to provide some explicit answers to potential differences 
in therapeutic concepts and how they acted on the brain. This is derived from a 
desire to be scientific and accurate and not make unsubstantiated claims. I have had 
to substantially adjust my understanding of what neuroscience can offer us in 
understanding therapies for depression on the basis of the evidence reviewed. I have 
been able to adjust my position and understanding due to my personal philosophy 
and belief in the value of evidence and will continue to adjust it on the basis of future 
evidence.  
 
The impact on my own therapeutic work has been that I retain my pluralistic position. 
By this I mean that I am open to the benefits of other approaches and may yet decide 
to undertake training in them. However my own way of working is based upon a 
person-centred foundation as this is the area of my trained competence. 
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Appendix 1, Table 4: Mapping Common Higher Order Themes in CT and PCT 
Causality & Therapy of Depression. 
Theory of Causation: CT Theory of Causation: PCT 
Philosophy: stoic and realistic attitude of 
both pessimism and optimism (that 
human beings have a strong tendency to 
sabotage themselves as well as also 
holding great capacity to change and self-
actualise).  
 
Strong roots in phenomenology as well as 
more modern cognitive psychology in his 
attitude towards ability to change.  
Philosophy: Phenomenological and 
humanism 
Anti power of therapist but also aware 
of the need for some imbalance 
(Rogers, ----) 
 
‘the individual has the capacity to 
guide, regulate and control himself, 
providing only that certain definable 
conditions exist’. (Rogers. 1979, p1.) 
 
Diathesis-stress framework 
(genetic/innate) 
 
‘’Operates within a diathesis-stress 
framework in which negative life stresses 
that match that match ones underlying 
negative schematic mode are more likely 
to provoke depression than events that 
are different from the mode.’’ (Clark & 
Beck, 2010, p419) 
 
Actualising tendency 
(innate) 
 
The only motive in the theory. The 
inherent tendency to develop all 
capacities in ways that serve to 
maintain or enhance  (Rogers, 1959, 
p196). 
 
Cognition The fundamental principle 
that different cognitions (defined by Beck 
(1964, p562/3) as’’ any mental activity 
that has a verbal content) give rise to 
different emotions’’. 
 
 
‘’Appears to be an interaction between 
cognition and affect because the 
converse also seems to be rue; the more 
intense the affective state, the credible 
the depressive cognitions seem to the 
patient. Also when the intensity of the 
affect is reduced, there is apt to be a 
diminution in the compelling quality of the 
cognition.’’(Beck, 1964, p568) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fundamental principle  
that distorting or denying experience 
causes tension / distress through 
discrepancy between ideal-self and 
the self-concept re-enforced by 
conditionality of others.  
 
’’ Reciprocal relationship between 
cause and effect and in awareness 
that choices are made, spontaneous 
forms created. We see here perhaps 
the highest of human functions’’ 
(Rogers 1979, p5) 
 
Definition of experiencing – 
experiencing a feeling ‘an emotionally 
tinged experience, together with its 
personal meaning. Thus it includes 
emotion, but also the cognitive 
content of the meaning of that 
emotion in its experiential context. It 
thus refers to the unity of emotion and 
cognition as they are experienced 
inseparably in the moment’’ (Rogers, 
1959, p198). 
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Cognitions have 3 levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Levels of cognition (Wright, 2006) 
1) Consciousness is defined as a state 
in which rational decisions are made 
in full awareness (p174) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) automatic thoughts flow rapidly and 
may not be assessed for accuracy or 
relevance – everyone has them but in 
depression riddled with errors in logic 
(p174) 
 
3) Schema’s or core beliefs deepest level 
– rules or templates for information 
processing shaped by developmental 
events or life experiences (p174) 
 
‘’The value of a cognition lies in its 
experiential effect. In therapy we 
pursue the differences in experience 
a thought produces. Otherwise we 
might miss the change and be left 
with just the thought. (Gendlin, 1996). 
 
 
Consciousness a small but very 
important part. (Rogers, 1979, p5) 
 
Awareness: Awareness / 
symbolisation / conciousness seen as 
the symbolic representation (not 
neccessarily in verbal symbols) 
(1959) (Rogers states percpeption 
and awareness synonamous in his 
theory) p198. 
 
What part does awareness play in 
formative function – ‘’the ability to 
focus conscious attention seems to 
be one of the latest developments  of 
our species – a tiny peak of 
awareness, of symbolising capacity 
topping a vast pyramid of 
nonconcious organismic functioning’’. 
(Rogers 1979, p5). 
 
Accurate symbolisation in awareness 
rests on the ability to test hypothesis 
– failure to test leads to 
incongruence. (Rogers, 1959, p199) 
 
 ‘’physical and biological processes 
are more intricate and more capable 
of novel  configurations than cognitive 
systems. Elaborations of them 
increase their intricacy.’’( Gendlin, 
1996, p246) 
‘‘Normally a matching process would 
occur so that a schema evoked by a 
particular stimulus is congruent with it. In 
psychopathology though this is upset by 
the intrusion of the hyperactive 
idiosyncratic schema’’ (Beck, 1964, p565) 
 
‘’Instead of a schema being selected to fit 
the external details, the details are 
selectively abstracted to fit the schema. 
The result is inevitably distortion of reality. 
Events that reinforce the self-concept 
symbolised –those that don’t 
experienced as a threat and denied 
or distorted until forced to be 
considered. (Rogers, 1959, p226) 
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‘‘ (p565). 
Developmental model identified early 
childhood trauma experiences and the 
formation of dysfunctional beliefs as 
predisposing events and congruent 
stressors in later life as precipitating 
factors.(Beck, 2008, p969 /70) 
 
Morley & Moran, 2011 suggest links 
between cognitive vulnerability and 
attachment theory 
Otherwise theory silent on relational 
aspects over genetic aspects of 
development. 
With the development of the 
awareness of self comes the need for 
positive regard (Standal cited by 
Rogers, 1959, p223). When a person 
perceives that some of their self-
experiences are less worthy of 
positive regard than others they 
develop ‘conditions of worth’ and only 
positively regard themselves when 
meeting the approval of others to 
achieve positive regard. (Rogers, 
1959, p224). 
 
 
‘’Early adverse events faster negative 
attitudes and biases about the self, which 
are integrated into the cognitive formation 
in the form of schema’s’’(Beck 2008,  
p970) – this causes Cognitive 
Vulnerability 
 
Concept of two forms of processing can 
be traced back to Freud – primary and 
secondary processes. (Beck, (2008, 
p971). Beevers suggests two factor 
processing in depression. Proposes that 
cognitive vulnerability happens when 
negatively biased associative processing  
(bottom up) is uncorrected by reflective 
processing (top down).  (p971) 
 
Positive and negative schemas possible – 
focus on negative in theory as treatment 
options focussed on this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘’In conceptualizing a particular life 
situation, composed of a kaleidoscopic 
array of stimuli, an individual has a 
number of alternatives as to which 
aspects of the situation he extracts and 
how he combines these into a coherent 
pattern. 
Stereotyped or repetitive patterns are 
regarded as manifestations of cognitive 
IF CONDITIONS OF WORTH are 
imposed in order to receive positive 
regard then experiences are 
distorted, subceived or denied to 
awareness (Rogers, 1959, p224) 
 
 
 
‘’Some changes in clients’ cognitive 
categories take place in all forms of 
therapy, but it is well known that 
cognitive change alone  produces 
little real change in people. It can 
therefore seem that cognitive change 
as such has no role in therapy. This is 
a wrong conclusion.’’. (Gendlin, 1996, 
p238). 
 
 
 
Introjects  / distortions / denial to 
awareness/ subception due to the 
need for POSITIVE REGARD lead to 
incongruence / vulnerability and 
prevent the development of the ideal-
self . The difference between the 
ideal-self (what the person would 
most like to be based on their own 
experience) versus introjected self-
concept causes vulnerability or 
incongruence (‘what is commonly 
called neurotic behaviour’ Rogers, 
1959, p200) incongruence between 
self and experience gives potential for 
psychological disorganisation. 
 
Schemas could equate to 
configurations of self.. 
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organisations or structures ‘’ (Schemas).( 
Beck, 1964, p 562). 
 
 
 
Continuum principle – most helpful to see 
mental health issues as extreme versions 
of normal processes (Westbrook, 2011, 
p5) 
 
Move away from the integration of 
infancy not a conscious choice but a 
natural and tragic development in 
infancy. (Rogers, 1959, p226)  
Cognitive reactivity –‘’ fluctuations in 
negative attitudes about self in response 
to daily events’’. (Beck, 2008, p971) 
 
The Self-Concept has denied certain 
experiences in order to fit in with the 
perceived desired self-concept (in 
order to receive positive regard). 
External Locus of evaluation evident.  
Activated (Activating Event) by daily life 
events schemas produce attentional bias, 
negatively based interpretations and mild 
depressive symptoms( p 971)(Cognitive 
reactivity) (Behaviour) 
‘If a significant new experience 
demonstrates the discrepancy so 
clearly that it must be perceived’ 
 the person will feel threatened 
(Rogers, 1959, p229 
(Consequences) Repeated activation of 
the negative schemas become organized 
into a depressive mode – a network of 
cognitive, affective, motivational  
schemas (Beck 2008, p972) 
Configurations of Self (Mearns and 
Thorne (2007, p ---)match different 
modes. 
Accumulated negative events or severe 
adverse event impacts on the mode and 
makes it hypersalient (overly prominent) 
(Beck 2008, p972) 
Concept of self-disorganized by 
contradictory experience and difficulty 
assimilating it causes threat as 
disorganised / incongruent ‘what is 
commonly called neurotic 
behaviour’(Rogers, 1959, p203) 
(Neurosis defined by oxford dictionary 
as ‘a relatively mild mental illness that 
is not caused by organic disease, 
involving symptoms of stress 
(depression, anxiety, obsessive 
behaviour, hypochondria) but not a 
radical loss of touch with reality. 
The hypersalient mode takes over 
information processing resulting in 
increased negative appraisals and 
rumination Beck, 2008, p972) 
 
The cognitive control of emotionally 
significant appraisals is reduced in 
capability thus reappraisal of negative 
views is limited. (Beck, 2008, p972) 
 
Inner critic, negative self-
configuration 
 
 
 
If unaware of the incongruence 
person may see them self as 
adjusted (1959, p204) 
 
Result is depression Result incongruence / neurosis / 
depression  
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Appendix 1, Table 5. Mapping common themes in CT and PCT theories of 
therapy. 
CT Theory of Therapy PCT Theory of Therapy 
Key Principles 
 
Collaborative project between client and 
therapist taking a mentoring rather than 
instructional role in an adult to adult 
relationship. (Westbrook, Kennerley and 
Kirk, 2011, p42)  
 
 
Key Principles 
 
‘’The same conditions are regarded 
as sufficient for therapy, regardless of 
the particular characteristics of the 
client’’ (Rogers, 1959,p213) a 
footnote states that this paragraph 
may hve to be re-written ‘if a recent 
study of Kirtner is confirmed’. This 
study was partially confirmed by 
Kirtner and Cartwright but refuted by 
Perry.  
 
Therapist explains to client how PCT 
supposed to work and therapy relying 
on the conditions commences. 
 
‘’Therapy as usually practiced does 
not teach the patient how to do 
therapy. We thought by not doing 
anything therapeutic, we thought a 
patient could learn to do something 
therapeutic.’’ ‘’No matter how much 
time is spent with the motor off, that 
doesn’t turn it on’’. (Gendlin, 1969, 
p13) 
 
‘’Welcoming a felt sense is a 
deliberate cognitive response that 
must usually be learned’’(Gendlin, 
1996, 242). 
‘’In examining the validity of the cognition 
the patient learns to make a distinction 
between ‘’thinking’’ and ‘’believing’’.’’. 
(Beck, 1964, p569) 
If certain conditions exist then a 
process will occur which includes 
certain characterisitc elements. If this 
process occurs then certain 
personality and behavioural changes 
will occur. (Rogers, 1959). ‘’These 
seem to be the neccessary conditions 
of therapy, though othere elements 
are often, or usually present...and 
hypothesises that it never 
commences without these conditions 
being met’’ (Rogers, 1959, p213).  
 
Relationship / Therapy containing the 
6 neccessary conditions. 
 
Continuum principle – processes are Life is seen as the processof 
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exaggerated versions of normal 
processes so applicable to everyone 
(Westbrook et al, p5) 
 
becoming – moving towards 
becoming a fully functioning person, 
although no one can really acheive 
this. 
The Relationship The Relationship 
Collaborative project between client and 
therapist ‘’therapist knowledge about 
effective ways to solve problems and 
client expertise in his own experience of 
his problems’’. (Westbrook et al, p23) 
 
‘’Greater activity by the therapist, 
operationalizing the specific procedures, 
setting goals for each session as well as 
for the long term, assigning homework, 
and especially measuring mediated 
variables and outcomes’’. (Beck, 2005, 
p955) 
 
Problem formulation (interacting systems 
principle) cognition, affect, behaviour and 
physiology interact with each other in 
complex feedback processes. Padesky & 
Mooney (1990) hot cross bun model. Not 
mechanistic, very specific to each client 
and based on an understanding of what is 
maintaining the clients problem. 
(Westbrook et al, p32) 
(in this case each pair is different so no 
more manualised than other therapies). 
 
Two people are in psychological 
contact (Rogers, 1959, p213). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focus wherever the client chosses in 
classic therapy. In more experiential 
forms may work to set agreed goals. 
‘’physical and biological processes 
are more intricate and more capable 
of novel configurations than cognitive 
systems. Elaborations of them 
increase their intricacy.’’ Gendlin, 
1996,  
 
This is the KEY difference – 
directiveness 
In PCT the relationship conditions 
effectively teach this experientially  
through moelling the processes of 
reflection, and allowing reflection in a 
safe, unthreatening environment. To 
some degres leaves out what Rogers 
discovered about teaching and 
learning – and from his original theory 
that cognition and affect are both 
necessary. 
Therapist qualities that are valued in 
other therapies are equally important 
within CBT. Westbrook et al (p 31 ) They 
are specific that they mean in the Beckian 
model they are describing. 
 
CBT sees the relationship not as the 
fundamental tool, but as the foundation 
for effective therapy ‘’necessary but not 
sufficient for good treatment result’’ 
(Westbrook et al, p39) 
Empathy and UPR (Rogers, 1959, 
p213) 
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‘therapy is rarely fruitful if t is a purely 
intellectual discussion of abstract 
thoughts. If a client is experiencing no 
emotion during the process, it is very 
unlikely that he will achieve a shift in 
emotion of behaviour (Safran, 1998). 
Cited by Westbrook et al (p35) 
 
Congruence (p213) 
 
It can be useful for therapists to offer 
alternative ways of thinking. In this 
they may be adopting some ideas 
from cognitive therapy for a while- but 
in ways that don’t push the client into 
a passive role. Can be done as an 
expression of the therapists own 
convictions – being real and present 
(good description of congruence 
without calling it such). (Gendlin, 
1996,p240) 
 
Thinking is an important human ability 
– helping us construct and 
understand our world. Can’t be 
considered evolutionary irrelevant. 
Has got a bad name in therapy 
because it is so easily misused. 
‘’Thinking separated from other kinds 
of experience is called 
‘’intellectualizing’’ and brings little 
psychological change’’. Gendlin, 
1996,p240 
Client perception of therapist 
characteristics rather than behaviour of 
the therapist that indicate outcome 
(Wright & Davis, 1994 in Westbrook et al, 
p40) in beneficial effect of CBT over and 
above the therapeutic relationship. 
Percpetion (p213) 
Outcome Outcome 
Effective Coping Responses: 
 
Challenging negative assumptions 
Building new schemas through practice 
Relief from depression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘’On the basis of the matrix of schema’s 
the individual is able to orient himself in 
relation to time and space and to 
categorize his experiences in a 
meaningful way’’. (Beck, 1964, p562) 
  
 
Movement toward becoming a fully 
functioning person  
 
Process of defense reversed – 
usually threatening experiences 
accurately symbolised in awareness 
and assimiliated into the self-
structure. (can be seen as a cognitive 
process). 
 
Reduction in conditions of worth 
Increase in unconditional self-regard 
p216 (compassion) 
   
Extentionality vs Intensionality 
(Rogers, 1959, p206) ‘’aware of 
space-time anchorage of facts, 
dominated by facts not concepts, 
evaluate in multiple ways, be aware 
of different levels of abstratction, test 
78 
 
Encourage new experiences which will 
help form new more positive associations. 
 
‘’In examining the validity of the cognition 
the patient learns to make a distinction 
between ‘’thinking’’ and ‘’believing’’.’’. 
(Beck, 1964, p569) 
 
 
 
 
‘’to shift the patient’s mode of judging 
himself and his world from an exclusively 
deductive to a more inductive process; 
i.e. to form his judgements more in terms 
of objective evidence and less on the 
basis of biased assumptions and 
misconceptions’’. (Beck, 1964, p571). 
his inferences and abstractions 
against realty.’’ 
 
Psychological adjustmet: all 
experiencess are, or may be 
assimilated on a symbolic level  - 
synonomous with congruence of self 
and experience, or complete openess 
to experience (p206). 
 
 
Maturity (psychological). P207 
Percieves realistically, not defensive, 
accepts responsabilty for being 
different from others, accepts 
responsability for own behaviour, 
evaluates experience on the basis of 
evidence from own senses, changes 
evaluation of experience only on the 
basis of new evidence, accepts 
others as unique individuals different 
from self, prizes himself, and prizes 
others. 
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